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DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER 
and 






JUN {} 8 2009 
iNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
DECISION 
Benefits are DENIED effective 4/5/2009. 
The employer's account IS NOT CHARGEABLE on the claim. 
The Eligibility Determination dated 413012009 is hereby AFFIRMED. 
IDSTORY OF THE CASE 
The above-entitled matter was heard by Brent Marchbanks, Appeals Examiner of the Idaho 
Department of LabOT, on 512812009; by telephone in the City of Boise, in accordance with 
§72"" 1368(6) of the Idaho Employment Security Law. 
The claimant. TRACEY E FEARN. and Jamie Garvin. testified on her behalf. 
The employers. DAVID C AND MARSHA STEED, presented testimony for David and Alexander Steed 
and Paula Olsen. 
lSSUFS 
The issues before the Appeals Examiner are whether the employer's account is properly 
cbargeable for experience rating purposes for benefits paid to the claimant. according to 
§72-1351(2)(n) of the Idaho Employment Security Law and whether unemploYment is due to the 
claimant quitting voluntarily and, if so, whether with good cause connected with the employment 
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-OR- being discharged and. if so, whether for misconduct in connection with the employment, 
according to §72-1366(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based on the exhibits and testimony in the record. the following facts are found: 
1. The claimant worked for this farm equipment re~sale operation from January of 2002 
until April of 2009. 
2. In the first four of the fIve calendar quarters preceding the one in which the claimant 
applied for benefits, this employer paid the claimant more wages than did any other. 
3. She quit becallile of issues she classified as threats, harassment. and discrimination. 
4. The threat was that, if the claimant's sales did not improve and return to their levels in 
relation to other sales staff, her base salary of $50,000 per year would be cut. 
5. The harassment she described involved the owner, David Steed, asking the claimant non 
related work questions about her social life. personal finance and her church attendance, 
or lack thereof. 
6. The discrimination the claimant asserts involved what she saw as depriving her of sales 
commissions that she had earned, requiring her to sell equipment at a higher price than 
other sales staff. and office scheduling issues. 
7. The employer acknowledges that ''pressure'' was being applied to the claimant to increase 
her sales productivitY, including discussion of cutting her base pay. 
8. The parties presented directly conflicting testimony as to whether David Steed's 
questions to the claimant were inappropriate, bombastic and paternalistic or were simply 
expressions of concern about her well being. 
9. In response to the employer's denial of the allegation, the claimant did not describe any 
specific transaction in which she was denied a commission she was earned. or n particular 
individual piece of equipment for which she was given a different sales price than was 
another sales representative. 
10. The claimant was apparently obliged to adhere to a tighter schedule of presence in the 
office than were other sales personnel. 
11. The claimant and David Steed had met through church. He had also provided her with 
assistance in financial matters. 
AUTHORITY 
Section 72-1351(2)(a) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides in part that for 
experience rating purposes, no charge shall be made to the account of such covered employer 
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with respect to benefits paid to a worker who terminated his services voluntarily without good 
cause attributable to such covered employer. or who had been discbarged for misconduct in 
connection with such services. 
Section 72-1366(5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides that a claimant shall be 
eligible for benefits provided that the claimant's unemployment is not due to the fact that the 
claimant left employment voluntarily without good cause connected with employment. or was 
discharged for misconduct in connection with employment 
IDAPA Regulation 09.01.30.450 provides that: 
450. QUIT. Ref. Sec. 72-1366(5), Idaho Code. (3~19-99) 
01. Burden Of Proof. The claimant has the burden of proof to establish that he 
voluntarily left his employment with good cause in connection with the employment to be eUgible 
for benefits. 
(3-19-99) 
02. Cause Connected With Employment To be connected with employment, a claimant's 
reason(s)for leaving the employment must arise from the working conditions. job tasks, or employment 
agreement. If the claimant's reason(s) for leaving the employment arise from personaIInon job-related 
matters, the reasons are not connected with the claimant's employment (3-19-99) 
03. Good Cause. The standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of 
reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman. Whether good cause is present depends 
upon whether 8 reasonable person wonJd consider the circumstances resulting in the claimant's 
unemployment to be real, substantial, and compemng. (3-19-99) 
04. Moral Or Ethical Quit A claimant who leaves a job because of a reasonable and serious 
objection to the work requirements of the employer on momJ or ethical grounds and is otherwise eligible. 
shall not be denied benefits. (3-19-99) 
05. Quit Due To Health Or Physical Condition. A claimant whose unemployment is due to 
his health or physical condition which makes it impossible for him to continue to perfonn the duties of 
the job shall be deemed to have quit work with good cause connected with employment. (3-19-99) 
06. Quit For Permanent Work Or Quit Part·Time Work For Increase In Work Hours. A 
claimant who quits a temporary job for a permanent job or who quits part-time employment for 
employment with an increase in the number of hours of work shall be deemed to have quit work with 
good cause connected with employment (3-19-99) 
07. Quit Or Retirement During Employer Downsizing. An individual who has continuing 
suitable work available and who voluntarily elects to retire or to terminate employment dmiog a period of 
reorganization or downsizing will be considered to have voltmtanly quit the employment for personal 
reasons. (3-19-99) 
08. Unrelated Discharge Prior To Pending Resignation. A claimant. discharged before a 
pending resignation has occurred. for reasons not related to the pending resignation. shall have his 
eligibility detennined on the basis of the discharge. not on the pending resignation. (3-19-99) 
09. When Notice Of Resignation Prompts A Discharge. If a claimant had given notice of a 
pending resignation. but was discharged before the effective date of the resignation, both "separations" 
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must be considered. The following three (3) elements should be present for both actions to affect the 
claimant's eligibility: (3-19-99) 
(a) The employee gave notice to the employer of a specific separation date; 
(3-19~99) 
(b) The employer's decision to discharge the claimant before the effective date of the 
resigoation was a consequence of the pending separation; and (3-19-99) 
(c) The discharge occurred a short time prior to the effective date of the resignation. 
(3-19-99) 
CONCLUSIONS 
The preponderance of evidence in the record does not support a conclusion that the claimant was 
treated differently than other sales staff in terms of commissions earned and pricing of 
equipment. Nor does raising the potential of a pay cut in the context of the need to improve sales 
fall outside the scope of generally accepted business practices. 
The employer's admittedly non-work related inquiries into the claimant's personal circumstances 
are troubling. Such matters are not an employer's business. Nevertheless, the personal history 
the two share makes it unclear as to whether such inquiries were inappropriate meddling and 
pressure by an employer or an ongoing aspect of a personal relationship. 
The claimant has not proven that the terms and conditions of her employment were so 
substandard that it was reasonable to quit 
The claimant quit without good cause connected with employment Benefits cannot be granted. 
The employer's account is not chargeable on the claim. 
~ rent March anks "-
Appeals Examiner 
Examinador de Apelaciones 
Dote ofMalling :( /.). 'I / Il A.. 
Fecba De Envio 
Last Day To Appeal 
Ultimo Dia Para Apelar 
APPEAL RIGHTS 
You have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM TI:m DATE OF MAILlNG to fIle a written appeal witb 
the Idaho Industrial CoIIiInission. The appeal must be taken or mailed to: 
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Or delivered in person to; 
Industrial Commission 
Judicial Division. IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83 no 
Boise. ID 83720-0041 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Or transmitted by facsimile to: (208) 332-7558 
If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal filed 
by facsimile transmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on 
the last day to appeal. A facsimile transmission received after 5:00 p.rn. will be deemed received by 
the Commission on the next business day. A. ~ ~ will be dismissed. Appeals filed by any 
means with the Appeals Bureau or a Department of Labor Local Office will.!!Qt be accepted by the 
Commission. TO EMPWYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: If you file an appeal with the 
Idaho Industrial Commission, the appeal must be signed by a corporate ajJicer or legal counsel 
licensed to practice in the State of Idaho and the signature must include the individual's title. The 
Commission will not consider appeals submitted by employer representatives who are not attorneys. 
If you request a hearing before the Commission or pennission to file a legal brief, you must make 
these requests through legal counsel licensed to practice in the State of Idllho. Questions should be 
directed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334-6024. 
If no appeal is filed, this decision will become final and cannot be changed. TO CLAIMANT: If 
this decision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment. If an appeal is filed, you 
should continue to report on your claim as long as you are unemployed. 
DERECHOS DE APELACI6N 
Usted tiene CATORCE (14) DIAS DESDE LA FECHA DE ENVIO para archivar una apelaci6n 
escrita con Ia Comisi6n Industrial de Idaho. La apelaci6n debe Set llevada 0 enviada a: 
o ser entregada en persona a: 
Industrial Commission 
Iudicial Division. IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
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Boise, Idaho 83712 
o puede enviarla por fax a: (208) 332-7558. 
Si la apelaci6n es enviada por correo, Ia fecha en el sello del correo debe ser no mas tarde de la 
fecha del Ultimo dia en que puede apelar. Una apelaci6n tardada sera descartada. Apelaciones 
archivadas con ]a Agenda de Apelaciones 0 con la Oficina de Empleo !!Q seran aceptadas por la 
Comisi6n. Una apelaci6n archivnda por medio de fax debe ser recibida por la comisi6n no mas 
tarde de las 5:00 PM. Hom Standard de la Montana. del Ultimo dia en que puede apelar. Una 
transmisi6n de fax recibida despues de las 5:00 P.M. se considera:ra recibida par 1a comision, hasta 
e1 proximo dia Mhil. EMPLEADORES QUE SON INCORPORADOS: Si una apelaci6n es 
archivada en la Comiswn Industrial de Idaho, la apelaciOn tiene que ser finnada por un aficial a 
representante designatio )! la finna debe incluir el urula del individuo. Si solicita una audiencia 
ante la Comisi6n Industrial. 0 permiso para archivar un escrito legal, esta solicitud se debera de 
hacer por media de un abagado can licencia para practicar en el estado de ldaho. Preguntas 
deben ser dirigidas a fa Comiswn Industrial de ItkJlw. Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334-6024. 
Si ninguna apelaci6n se archiva, esta decisi6n sera la final y no podra cambiarse. AL 
RECLAMANTE: Si esta decisi6n se cambia, todos los beneficios pagados estaran sujetos a 
reembolso. Si una apelaci6n se archiva, usted deberla de continua! reportando en su reclamo 
rnientras este desempleado. 
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APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 WEST MAlN STREET I BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720 
(208) 332-35721 (800) 6214938 
FAX: (208) 334-6440 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on YAY J t 2009 " a true and correct copy of 
Decision of Appeals Examiner was served by regular United States mail upon each of the 
following: 
TRACY E FEARN 
1545 GARFIELD ST 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401*3033 
DAVID C AND MARSHA STEED 
DBA DAVID STEED COMPANY 
3805 NYELLOWSTONE HWY 
IDAHO FALLS ID 8340 1 
cc: Idaho Department of Labor Idaho Falls Local Office 
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Dpcket Page 1 of 1 
Docket No 14861 yr 12009. Docket Participants Exhibits Issues Calendar 
Schedule Determinations 
Must have both Docket No and Year to edit 
appeals. 
Appeal Information 
Get Docket Info Clear 
Office 113 Idaho Falls 3 SS Appellant Party 
!ClairTlant . . 3 
File Date 105/0612009 Process Status I NoticeofTelephoneHearing 
Save I 
Summary Info Only(can not edit below): 
4861-2009 IT RACY E FEARN ~ID-AV-I-D-C-A-N-D-M-A-R-SH-A-S-T-E-ED-.113u 105/06/2009· 
Issues: Hearing Schedule: 
010-010 - Voluntary Quit; 021- ,"-M-a-y-2-8-20-0-9-1-0-:0-0-A-M-S-r-en-t-M-a-rc-h-ba-n-k-s--
Chargeability; I 
· 0 Appellant:!Claimant 
Updated:105/11/2009 BY:leglo~ckl 
Tracy E. Fearn 1 David C. And Marsha Steed 
Notes: 
2009-06-09 13:27:07-(ts) - Rec'd Ie protest; processed as needed.; 
2009-05-27 14:47:40-(tc) - recvd fax fun cImnt to get records frm emplyr, gave to hearing 
l 
JUl 0 2009 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
http://intranet.labor.idaho .gov! applications/ other/ appealsconference/ AnnealEntrv / A nneall)... 7/1 O/?009 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
1515 E. Lincoln Road 
Idaho Falls, 10 83401-2129 
Phone: (208) 557-2500 
Fax; (208) 52£5..7041 
Fax 
Idaho Department of Labor customers are pennitted to ,use this fax in 
connection with employment related activities. If you receive a fax 
that is not employment related or is otherwise inappropriate) please 
contact the Manager Wade Vir~ at 557 .. 2500. 
Comments: 
~) 
... ,,1 ... ..,"" ....... - .... -. .._-_.-
June 4,2009 
Appeals Bureau 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W Main St 
Boise, ID 83735 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I would like to appeal the latest decision to deny my unemployment benefits. 
I feel strongly about the reaSOns I felt forced to quit my job. I am quite certain 
if you would take the time to get personal testlmony from Dick Rubottom who 
was employed there at the same time as myself from 2002 through October 
2008 and also from Theresa Tabor who was also employed there at the same 
time as I was, and after Dick was gone, until April of 2009. They will attest to 
the daily harassment (badgering and questioning) of my persona/life and issues 
that they witnessed themselves. I have supplied their phone numbers previously 
and they also gave short written statements. 
There is a current employee that also made a complaint on my behalf (unknown 
to me at the time) regarding the harassment she felt was taking place towards 
me from the owner. It would be worthwhile having a discussion with her. 
I will wait to hear back from you. My mailing address is PO Box 3569, Idaho 
Falls, ID 83403 and my phone number is 208-206-0734. 
Sincerely, 
/(f)(f W) ro fJJv---
1ra'c~ JJn 
I nn I ("7('" on? I I vn I \1",.,1.""'1 ''''' • ,-.- "' •••• _. 
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Employer, 
and 















IDOL # 4861-2009 
NOTICE OF 
FILING OF APPEAL 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Industrial Commission has received an appeal from a 
decision of an Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. A copy of the appeal is 
enclosed. Documents that are already part of the record or file will not be copied. 
Further action will be taken by the Industrial Commission in accordance with its Rules of 
Appellate Practice and Procedure, a copy of which is enclosed. 
PLEASE READ ALL THE RULES CAREFULLY 
The Commission will make its decision in this appeal based on the record ofthe proceedings 
before the Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. To request a briefing schedule or 
hearing, refer to Rule 5(A) and 7(A,B) of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS DIVISION 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6024 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 1 
L / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10TH day of June, 2009, a true and correct copy of the Notice of 
Filing of Appeal (and compact disc ofthe Hearing to follow) was served by regular United States 
mail upon the following: 
TRACY E. FEARN 
1545 GARFIELD ST 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401-3033 
DA VID C AND MARSH STEED 
DBA DAVID STEED COMPANY 
3805 N YELLOSTONE HWY 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
mcs 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 2 /2-
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ' 
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE - ISB# 3431 
KATHERINE T AKASUGI - ISB# 5208 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050 
CHERYL GEORGE - ISB# 4213 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3184 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY E. FEARN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
DA VID STEED COMPANY, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
















TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES: 
IDOL NO. 4861-2009 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Please be advised that the undersigned Deputy Attorney General representing the 
Idaho Department of Labor hereby enters the appearance of said attorneys as the 
attorneys of record for the State of Idaho, Department of Labor, in the above-entitled 
proceeding. By statute, the Department of Labor is a party to all unemployment 
insurance appeals in Idaho. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 {3 
· rf1 DATED thIS liP day of June, 2009. 
Tracey K. Rol e 
Deputy Atto e General 
Attorney for the State of Idaho, 
Department of Labor 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this /" {I!I day of June, 2009, to: 
TRACY E FEARN 
1545 GARFIELD ST 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401-3033 
DA VID STEED COMPANY 
3805 N YELLOWSTONE'HWY 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 l't 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY E. FEARN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
DAVID C. AND MARSHA STEED, 
Employer, 
and 















IDOL # 4861-2009 
F LE 
JUL 1 3 2009 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of July, 2009 a true and correct copy of the compact 
disc of the Hearing held on May 28, 2009, was served by regular United States mail upon the 
following: 
TRACY E. FEARN 
1545 GARFIELD ST 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401-3033 
DA VID C AND MARSH STEED 
DBA DAVID STEED COMPANY 
3805 N YELLOSTONE HWY 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83401 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
mes 
Ass~starlt Commission Secretary 
\ i 
\J 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY E. FEARN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
DAVID C. AND MARSHA STEED, 
Employer, 
and 

















DECISION AND ORDER 
F E 
AUG 3 2009 
!NDUSTRIAl COMMISSION 
Appeal of a Decision issued by an Appeals Examiner with the Idaho Department of Labor 
ruling Claimant ineligible for unemployment benefits. REVERSED. 
Claimant, Tracy E. Fearn, appeals to the Industrial Commission a Decision issued by the 
Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") ruling her ineligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits. The Department's Appeals Examiner concluded that (1) Claimant voluntarily 
left employment without good cause connected with employment, and (2) Employer's account is 
not chargeable for experience rating purposes. With her request for appeal, Claimant requested 
to call additional witnesses to provide testimony for consideration on appeal. We treat such 
correspondence as a request for a new hearing and address this matter below. 
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record as 
provided for in Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) and opinions issued by the Idaho Supreme Court. The 
Commission has relied on the audio recording of the hearing the Appeals Examiner held on May 
28,2009, along with the exhibits [1 through 13] admitted into the record during that proceeding. 
DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
J b 
NEW HEARING 
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) gives the Commission authority to "in its sole discretion, conduct 
a hearing to receive additional evidence or [ ... ] remand the matter back to the appeals examiner for 
an additional hearing and decision." In this case, Claimant seeks consideration on appeal of 
additional testimony from three witnesses. (Claimant's request for appeal, filed June 4, 2009). 
Rule 7(B)5 of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho 
Employment Security Law, effective as amended March 1,2009, provides that a party requesting 
a hearing to offer additional evidence shall submit the "reason why the proposed evidence was 
not presented before the examiner." Whether a party seeks to present additional evidence or 
make an oral argument based on the record as it stands, that party must present some justification 
for that request. Unemployment insurance appeals are adjudicated under the principles and 
procedures of administrative law. Hearings at this level of review are not a matter of right, as in 
some other forums. 
Even though Claimant participated in the Appeals Examiner's Hearing, she now seeks 
consideration on appeal of written testimony from herself and another witness. Prior to the 
hearing, Claimant was informed that she had an opportunity to investigate the issues related to 
her discharge and that she would only be permitted to provide additional testimony after the 
hearing in rare circumstances. (Exhibit 2). 
In addition, Claimant was notified in the documents accompanying the hearing notice of 
the procedures for submitting evidence to be admitted into the hearing record and for requesting 
that the Appeals Examiner reopen the hearing. The information document clearly stated under 
the heading "EVIDENCE" the instructions for admitting evidence into the hearing record and 
under "REOPENING THE HEARING" that Claimant had 10 days to file a request in writing 
with the Appeals Bureau if she had witnesses who were unable to appear at the hearing or had 
evidence that was not available at the time of the hearing. (Exhibit 2). Although Claimant 
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provided the telephone numbers for two of the witnesses she now seeks leave to call, she did not 
notify them of the time for her hearing so they were unavailable when the Appeals Examiner 
telephoned them. (Audio recording). Although neither witness came to the telephone, the 
Appeals Examiner indicated on the record that he had left messages with each, providing 
instructions for calling in and joining the hearing. (Audio recording). Nevertheless, neither 
witness called before the hearing was concluded. (Audio recording). Further, there is no 
evidence in the record to suggest that Claimant took any steps to utilize the established 
procedures to admit evidence at the hearing concerning the third witness she seeks to call or to 
request that the hearing be reopened. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that the Commission's determination of 
whether to consider additional evidence is within the Commission's sole discretion. Further, 
those decisions will not be overturned absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Appeals 
Examiner of Idaho Department of Labor v. lR. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 955 P.2d 1097 
(1998). The Commission takes the position that conducting a new hearing at this level of review 
is an extraordinary measure and should be reserved for those cases when due process or other 
interests of justice demand no less. We have carefully reviewed the record and can find no 
evidence that Claimant was deprived of due process. Consequently, Claimant's request for a 
new hearing is DENIED. Further, we will consider only that evidence in the record as 
established by the Appeals Examiner. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based on the testimony and the evidence, the Commission concurs with and adopts the 
Findings of Fact as set forth in the Appeals Examiner's Decision. 
DISCUSSION 
Claimant worked for Employer from January 2002 until April 2009, most recently as a 
heavy machinery salesperson. (Audio recording). Claimant quit her job because David Steed, 
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owner, had threatened to reduce her base pay if she did not improve her sales; had continually 
asked and lectured Claimant about her finances, personal life, and church attendance; and had 
allowed her fewer freedoms in the office than he allowed Claimant's male counterparts. (Audio 
recording; Exhibit 11). 
Because there is no dispute among the parties that Claimant quit, the only issue before us 
is whether Claimant had good cause for quitting that job. Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides in 
part that a claimant is eligible for unemployment insurance benefits if he or she quits for good 
cause related to employment. If an employee voluntarily quits his or her job, that employee 
bears the burden of proving that the terms and conditions of that employment provided him or 
her with good cause to quit. Moore v. Melaleuca, Inc., 137 Idaho 23, 43 P.3d 782 (2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Administrative Code both define what 
constitutes "good cause" for quitting employment for the purpose of establishing eligibility 
for unemployment benefits. IDAPA 09.01.30.450.03 provides that good cause is established 
when the claimant demonstrates that his or her real, substantial, and compelling circumstances 
would have forced a "reasonable person" to quit. Stated another way, "good cause" exists 
when the essential conditions of the workplace environment are so extraordinary that an average 
person standing in the claimant's place would prefer joblessness to continuing the employment 
relationship. See Ewins v. Allied Security, 138 Idaho 343, 347-48, 63 P3d 469,473-74 (2004); 
Burroughs v. Employment Sec. Agency, 86 Idaho 412,414, 387 P.2d 473, 474 (1963). Purely 
personal reasons are not "good cause" for quitting ajob. 
In addition, the good cause must be related to the employment. To be connected with 
employment, IDAPA 09.01.30.450.02 provides that a claimant's reason(s) for leaving the 
employment must arise from the working conditions, job tasks, or employment agreement. If the 
claimant's reason(s) for leaving the employment arise from personal/non-job-related matters, the 
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reasons are not connected with the claimant's employment. The employee must explore all 
viable options before making the decision to quit. Moore, 137 Idaho at 28,43 P.3d at 787. 
Claimant testified that she quit because of threats, harassment, and discrimination in the 
workplace by David Steed, owner of Employer. (Audio recording). Her testimony and her 
journal, kept as the events unfolded, indicate that Mr. Steed threatened to fire her or lower her base 
pay if she did not increase her sales as late as April 2009; that Mr. Steed required her to remain at 
the office during lunch unless there was another salesperson there, whereas the male salespeople 
could go to lunch regardless of coverage; and that Mr. Steed continually inquired into and lectured 
Claimant about her personal life, as illustrated by the following summarized examples: 
1. In March 2006, Mr. Steed told her she needed to be harder on her son and 
send him to a camp to make him learn to work; 
2. In April 2006, Mr. Steed told her she needed a man to take care of her and 
to look into match. com or ldssingles.com; 
3. In November 2006, Mr. Steed told her she needed to find a man to do 
things with and asked if she ever thought of being a lesbian; 
4. In February 2007, Mr. Steed told her he was concerned about her 
temperament during slow months because "as a woman" her emotions get 
more strung out than a man's; 
5. In April 2008, Mr. Steed told her that she would not last in a medical 
profession because she needs counseling for her attitude, that the way she 
reacts to stress is not right or good or normal, and that no one is going to 
treat her as well as he will because he cares about her and is only trying to 
make her the best person she can be; 
6. In May 2008, Mr. Steed inquired as to why she had not been at church, 
then became angry when she told him that that was a personal matter and 
not related to work; 
7. In August 2008, Mr. Steed told her she should be "man enough" to admit 
mistakes and that she could not ask questions, make comments, etc., about 
issues he would raise and berated her about her attitude when she 
questioned him about this requirement; 
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8. In October 2008, Mr. Steed told her she would be let go if she could not 
"put a smile on her face"; 
9. In October 2008, Mr. Steed inquired as to her doctor' sappointment, to 
which she responded that it was none of his business; 
10. In October 2008, Mr. Steed inquired as to whether a man who Mr. Steed 
had encouraged to "court" her had called and lectured her on being 
respectful to him (Mr. Steed) after she told him to stay out of her business; 
11. In January 2009, Mr. Steed inquired as to· her personal motivations, 
finances, etc., prior to signing a sheet (verifying employment) necessary 
for a nursing school loan application; and 
12. In March 2009, Mr. Steed lectured her regarding her upcoming marriage 
and how difficult it would be and how it might not work because she was 
so stubborn. 
(Exhibit 11). 
Also in March 2009, Claimant's evidence indicates she was told she might not get time 
off for her honeymoon from April 17 through April 23, 2009 (4 days off total). (Exhibit 11, p. 
42). Jamie Garvin, former secretary for Employer during Claimant's employment, testified that 
Claimant was required to remain in the office more than other salespeople, was generally treated 
differently, and that she heard Mr. Steed asking Claimant about personal matters. (Audio 
recording). 
In addition, Claimant's journal details how Mr. Steed and his son, Alexander Steed (who 
was Claimant's general manager), increasingly micromanaged Claimant, to the point where she 
was required to show them all of her e-mails and go over every sale with them. (Exhibit 11). 
Claimant also believed that she was not getting credit for all of her sales and that the other 
salespeople were allowed to sell items at lower prices than she could sell them for. (Audio 
recording; Exhibit 11). The beginning of this period coincided with the replacement of 
Claimant's former manager with Alexander Steed. (Exhibit 11). 
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On April 1, 2009, Claimant turned in her written resignation indicating that her last day 
would be April 8. (Exhibit 3, p. 1). Before her last day, Claimant sent out an email to 7,500 of 
Employer's business contacts indicating that they could reach her on her cell phone after April 8. 
(Audio recording; Exhibit 5, p. 8). David Steed testified that he dismissed Claimant early, 
paying her through April 6, because he felt Claimant was being disloyal in sending those emails. 
(Audio recording; Exhibit 5, pp. 5-6). 
Mr. Steed also testified that although Claimant was a talented salesperson, she had a bad 
attitude and was distracted toward the end of her employment. (Audio recording; Exhibit 5, p. 
5). Mr. Steed admitted that he had threatened to reduce Claimant's base pay if she did not 
increase her sales and also that he inquired into Claimant's well-being and whether she had been 
at church on occasion, because he was personally concerned about her. (Audio recording). Mr. 
Steed further testified that he had hired Claimant, a single mother at the time, on a referral from 
his church (which Claimant also attended) and had sometimes "tried to do things for Miss Fearn 
that she didn't solicit." (Audio recording). For example, Mr. Steed testified, and Alexander 
Steed confirmed, that in approximately 2002, Mr. Steed assisted Claimant in negotiating with her 
bank and providing her an interest-free car loan. (Audio recording; Exhibit 7). In addition, the 
parties agree, Mr. Steed bought Claimant a freezer as a "bonus". (Audio recording). 
Mr. Steed, Paula Olsen, Employer's accountant, and Alexander Steed also testified that 
Claimant was never denied credit for a sale and had always been treated fairly. (Audio recording; 
Exhibit 5, pp. 1-3, 5-6). Mr. Steed testified that Claimant actually had a better arrangement than 
the other salespeople because she only had to sell $175,000 to be eligible for a commission, 
whereas the others had higher thresholds. (Audio recording). In his closing, Mr. Steed surmised 
that the job of selling was taxing on Claimant's emotional makeup. (Audio recording). 
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After a careful review of the record, we find insufficient evidence that Mr. Steed's 
warnings in connection with Claimant's sales performance, or his treatment of Claimant with 
respect to crediting her sales or pricing products sold by her, constitute good cause for Claimant to 
voluntarily quit. Claimant did not dispute that her sales had declined, and although she attributed 
this decline to Mr. Steed's behavior towards her, it was nevertheless within Mr. Steed's authority 
to warn Claimant of the potential consequences. Further, Claimant's allegations that her sales were 
not all appropriately credited to her were refuted by all three of Employer's witnesses and her 
allegation that she was required to sell products at higher prices than some employees was refuted 
by Mr. Steed. We allocate equal weight to the testimony of each party; as a result, Claimant has 
failed to prove these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. 
As the Appeals Examiner pointed out, Mr. Steed's regular and repeated inquiries into the 
most delicate aspects of Claimant's personal life, even after she told him it was none of his 
business, while she was at work, present a more difficult question. So do the paternalistic and 
sexist tones of many comments and inquiries Claimant attributes to Mr. Steed. 
The claimant in Moore v. Melaleuca, Inc., 137 Idaho 23, 43 PJd 782 (2002), was subjected 
to sexist treatment by her supervisor. Moore's supervisor told her, when he learned she was 
pregnant, that she should quit and stay home with the child and, if she were his wife, he would 
insist that she do so. Then, two weeks prior to her maternity leave, the chief of operations, who 
had no first-hand knowledge of her performance, told her he was unhappy with her performance on 
the job and that there were people waiting in line to replace her. After the child was born and 
Moore returned to work, she was required to report to a new employee/supervisor, with less 
experience than she had, and had received a lower than expected raise. The Idaho Industrial 
Commission found Moore had been discriminated against based upon her decision not to stay 
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home with her baby. Based on these facts, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Idaho Industrial 
Commission's determination that Moore had "good cause" to leave her employment. 
Like the employer's actions in Moore, Mr. Steed's sex- and religion-based comments and 
lectures, in connection with his inappropriate questioning into Claimant's personal life while she 
was at work, were offensive to Claimant, and she told him so. Nevertheless, he persisted. In 
addition, Claimant was not allowed to come and go at the office as the male salespeople were 
allowed to do. We find that such behavior would offend a reasonably prudent employee and that 
it created a hostile working environment for Claimant. While Claimant did not always endure 
Mr. Steed's opinions quietly and did not always present with a demeanor favored by Mr. Steed, 
these are not defenses to Mr. Steed's harassing treatment of Claimant. Moreover, although 
Claimant did not establish that Employer compensated her unfairly, this is not a requirement to 
find a hostile work environment. 
We also find that Claimant exhausted all viable options by telling Mr. Steed repeatedly 
that her personal life was none of his business. As the owner of the company, Mr. Steed held 
ultimate authority over the matter, and Claimant's admonitions to him were futile. There was 
nothing more she could do. 
Idaho unemployment insurance benefits are reserved for limited circumstances that are 
well-defined by the Idaho unemployment insurance law. That law, summarized in relevant part 
above, requires that a Claimant who voluntarily quits her job must have good cause connected 
with employment. We find Mr. Steed's sexist comments to Claimant and his repeated inquiries 
into her religious practices and personal life, without her consent, gave Claimant good cause to 
quit. We further find that Claimant explored all viable options before deciding to quit, as is 
required under the Idaho Employment Security Law. 
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As a result, we find that Claimant met her burden of proving that she had good cause to 
quit her job with Employer. Claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits. 
In this case, Employer paid the most wages to Claimant during the last four base quarters. 
(Exhibit 5). Idaho Code §72-1351 (2)(a) provides that an employer's experience rated account is 
chargeable for benefits paid to a claimant whose separation from employment resulted from 
discharge for reasons other than misconduct or a voluntary separation for good cause. Because 
we conclude that Claimant had good cause for quitting her job with Employer, we find that 
Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I 
We conclude that Claimant had good cause related to her employment for quitting her job 
with Employer. 
II 
We further conclude that Employer's account IS chargeable for expenence 
rating purposes. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED 
and Claimant is eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. This is a final order under Idaho 
Code § 72-1368(7). 
DA1ED this:E1 day of ~ ,2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY E. FEARN, IDOL # 4861-2009 
Claimant, 
v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
DAVID C. AND MARSHA STEED, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
COMES NOW Employer David C. Steed and Marsha Steed ("Steed") and sut>mits 
to the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho this Motion for Reconsideration of the 
Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission filed August 31, 2009. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On or about April 1, 2009, Claimant Tracy E. Fearn ("Fearn") resigned her 
employment with Steed, designating her last day of employment to be April 8,2009. On 
1 
April 6, 2009, Steed fired Fearn for sending emails to 7,500 clients, giving them her personal 
contact information. Subsequently, Fearn applied for unemployment benefits. Fearn was 
denied, and appealed the denial of benefits. On May 28,2009, Fearn's appeal was heard by 
Brent Marchbanks, Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. Evidence related 
to Fearn's eligibility for unemployment benefits was presented at the hearing by both Fearn 
and Steed. On May 29,2009, the Appeals Examiner issued his opinion regarding Fearn's 
eligibility for unemployment benefits and affirmed the previous determination denying her 
benefits. In his decision, he also noted several findings of fact. 
F earn appealed the decision of the Appeals Examiner to the Industrial Commission. 
Included in Fearn's appeal was a request for a new hearing which was ultimately denied. 
However, based upon the findings of fact as set forth in the Appeals Examiner's decision, 
as well as the evidence in the record as established by the Appeals Examiner, the Industrial 
Commission found "insufficient evidence that Mr. Steed's warnings in connection with 
Claimant's sales performance, or his treatment of Claimant with respect to crediting her sales 
or pricing products sold by her, constitute good cause for Claimant to voluntarily quit." The 
Industrial Commission further found that "Mr. Steed's sexist comments to Claimant and his 
repeated inquiries into her religious practices and personal life, without her consent, gave 
Claimant good cause to quit. We further find that claimant explored all viable options before 
deciding to quit..." (Decision and Order, p. 8, 9). 
2 
Steed now submits this Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules 
of Appellate Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Employment Security Law. Steed 
requests that the Industrial Commission reconsider its conclusions in the Decision and Order 
because (1) the evidence in the record reflects that Fearn was discharged for misconduct prior 
to her pending resignation, and as such, Fearn's unemployment benefits eligibility should 
have been decided on the basis of her discharge for misconduct and not on her pending 
resignation, and (2) Fearn did not meet her burden ofproofto establish that she voluntarily 
left her employment with good cause in connection with her employment. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Industrial Commission Erred by Failing to Consider Misconduct that 
Occurred During the Pending Resignation 
Even if Fearn were eligible for unemployment compensation because she had good 
cause to leave her employment, her actions in sending e-mails to clients prior to her end of 
employment was misconduct that eliminated her eligibility. While the Industrial 
Commission's legal conclusions maybe freely reviewed (Moore v. Melaleuca, 137 Idaho 23, 
26, 43 P.3d 782, 785 (2002)), its findings of fact must be supported by substantial and 
competent evidence (Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329, 331-32 
(2000)). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. Jensen v. City a/Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412,18 P.3d 
211,217 (2000). 
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Pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Code, any discharge that occurs prior to the date 
of resignation must be considered for eligibility. Section 09.01.30.450.08 states as follows: 
08. Unrelated Discharge Prior to Pending Resignation. A claimant, 
discharged before a pending resignation has occurred, for reasons not related 
to the pending resignation, shall have his eligibility determined on the basis of 
the discharge, not on the pending resignation. 
IDAPA 09.01.30.450.08. 
Claimant gave her written resignation on April 1, 2009, indicating her last day would 
be April 8,2009. (Exhibit 3). On April 6, 2009, Steed fired Fearn for sending out e-mails 
to approximately 7,500 clients regarding her end of employment and providing her cell phone 
for them to contact her. (Audio Recording; Exhibit 5, p. 8). David Steed testified that Fearn 
was fired for this action because it was unethical for Fearn to solicit Steed's clients and it was 
disloyal to the business. (Audio Recording; Decision and Order, p. 7). Fearn admitted to the 
Appeals Examiner that she intended to tell Steed's clients she was threatened, harassed, and 
discriminated against, confirming Steed's concerns about her loyalty. (Audio Recording). 
Fearn admitted in her "journal" that she was directed "not to send any e mails with out them 
checking them first" on March 25, 2009. (Exhibit 11, p. 42). In spite of this specific 
directive, Fearn sent two e-mail to approximately 7,500 clients, telling them she was leaving 
and providing her personal cell phone number. (Audio Recording; Exhibit 5, p. 4). The 
Appeals Examiner directed several questions on this issue to Fearn during the hearing, but 
misconduct was not analyzed. 
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Fearn's action to cause damage to Steed prior to her end of employment prohibits her 
receipt of unemployment compensation benefits. To demonstrate misconduct, "there must 
be a deliberate and intentional violation of the spirit of the rule. Misconduct is defined as 
(1) a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; (2) a deliberate violation of the 
employer's rules; or (3) a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right 
to expect of its employees." See Chapman v. NYK Line North America, Inc., 147 Idaho 178, 
_,207 P.3d 154, 158 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
In Fearn's case, her misconduct meets every definition of misconduct. First, she 
wilfully and intentionally disregarded Steed's interest in protecting its clients. Steed testified 
he was upset that F earn had sent her personal cell phone to clients so they could contact her 
because he believed Fearn was being disloyal and unethical. (Audio Hearing). Steed's 
decision to fire Fearn for misconduct was substantiated in the Hearing. Fearn admitted she 
sent Steed's clients her telephone number so they could contact her directly because a 
number ofthem were calling to find out why she was leaving. More disturbing, she admitted 
she intended to tell them she had been harassed and discriminated against as follows: 
Fearn: There was an original e-mail sent out saying I would no longer be 
with the company. There was a second e-mail that had my cell phone 
that said they could contact me on that if they wanted to. And the 
reason I sent that was because I, between sending that first e-mail 
saying I would no longer be with the company, I had ten or fifteen 
phone calls from my customers wanting to know what I was doing, 
why I was leaving and what's going on. And I told them I didn't feel 
politically correct discussing the matter with them until I was no 
longer with the business and that was the intent and why I sent the e-
mail with the cell phone - saying call me .... 
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Marchbanks: What would you be willing to tell them after April 8 that you were 
not willing to tell them before April 8? 
Fearn: That I was being harassed and discriminated against and ... 
Marchbanks: I can see why the employer might think that's unethical, don't you? 
(Audio Hearing). Regardless of whether Fearn had "good cause" to end her employment, she 
certainly could not seek to harm Steed by destroying its relationship with its clients. 
Second, as trust issues arose between Steed and Fearn, she was specifically directed not to 
send out any e-mails without them being reviewed first. (Exhibit 11, p. 42). Consequently, Fearn 
intentionally disregarded Steed's reasonable rule regarding her email use which, by her own 
admission, had been communicated to her. Fearn knew she was not permitted to send out the e-mails 
to clients and was looking to do nothing further than damage Steed's business. 
Finally, Steed had a reasonable expectation that its employee would not seek to interfere with 
and destroy its relationship with its clients. "For misconduct in standard-of-behavior cases, this 
Court applies a two-prong test: (1) whether claimant's conduct fell below the standard of behavior 
expected by the employer; and (2) whether the employer's expectations were objectively reasonable 
in the particular case." Welch v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 127 Idaho 361, 364, 900 P.2d 1372, 1375 
(1995). Analyzing the second prong, an "employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only 
where they have been communicated to the employee." Desilet v. Glass Doctor, 142 Idaho 655, 132 
P.3d 412 (2006). As stated previously, Fearn had specifically been directed to have her outgoing e-
mails reviewed. Consequently, regardless of whether those actions might be construed as micro-
managing, Fearn knew she was violating Steed's expected standard of conduct by sending e-mails 
to Steed's clients. Whether Fearn's intentions were to solicit clients or interfere with Steed's client 
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relationships, it matters little. Her contact with clients for her admitted purpose to inform them she 
had been harassed and discriminated against violated Steed's expected standards of conduct and 
amounts to misconduct. Fearn is not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. 
B. Claimant Failed to Demonstrate by Substantial and Competent Evidence that She had 
Good Cause to Quit Her Employment 
Fearn failed to carry her burden and establish she had good cause to quit. The Industrial 
Commission erred in finding good cause because it focused on events that occurred months and years 
before Fearn's end of employment and failed to consider the severity or pervasiveness of Mr. Steed's 
alleged harassment on Fearn's ability to perform her job. A finding by the Industrial Commission 
that an employee has shown "good cause" to quit is a factual determination, and must be supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. See Ewins v. Allied Security, 138 Idaho 343,347,63 P.3d 
469, 473 (2003). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a 
preponderance. Zapata v. JR. Simplot, 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999) (citing 
Boley v. State, 130 Idaho 278, 280, 939 P.2d 854, 856 (1997)). It is relevant evidence that a 
reasonable person might accept to support a conclusion. Id. In the case at hand, the Industrial 
Commission determined that claimant had good cause to quit, despite Fearn's failure to meet her 
burden of proof regarding good cause based upon the evidence in the record. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1366(5), in order to obtain unemployment benefits, the 
claimant's unemployment cannot be the result of her leaving employment voluntarily without good 
cause connected with her employment. It is the claimant's burden to establish that she voluntarily 
left her employment with good cause in connecti on with the employment. ID AP A 09.01.30.450.01. 
The claimant's reasons for leaving the employment must arise from working conditions, job tasks, 
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or employment agreement. If the claimant's reason(s) for leaving the employment arise from 
personal/non job-related matters, the reasons are not connected with the claimant's employment. 
See IDAPA 09.01.30.450.02. "In order to constitute good cause, the circumstances which compel 
the decision to leave employment must be real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, reasonable, 
not whimsical; there must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous 
circumstances. The standard of what constitutes good cause is the standard of reasonableness as 
applied to the average man or women." Ewins, 138 Idaho at 347-48,63 P.3d at 473-74; see also 
IDAP A 09.01.3 O. 03. Good cause "must not be extended to include purely personal and ( subjective) 
reasons which are unique to the employee - it must require that such cause is not a condition which 
by common knowledge is usual where accompanied by minor irritations." Meyer v. Skyline Mobile 
Homes, 99 Idaho 754, 758, 589 P.2d 89,93 (1979) (citing Boodry v. Eddy Bakeries, Inc., 88 Idaho 
165, 397 P.2d 256 (1964)). Finally, good cause requires that the employee explore all viable 
employment options before making the decision to quit. Ewins, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.3d 474. 
In its Decision and Order, the Industrial Commission ultimately concludes, "[a]fter a careful 
review of the record, we find insufficient evidence that Mr. Steed's warnings in connection with· 
Claimant's sales performance, or his treatment of Claimant with respect to crediting her sales or 
pricing products sold by her, constitute good cause for Claimant to voluntarily quit." (Decision and 
Order, p. 8). The Decision and Order also concludes that "Mr. Steed's sexist comments to Claimant 
and his repeated inquiries into her religious practices and personal life, without her consent, gave 
Claimant good cause to quit" and created a "hostile working environment." (Decision and Order, 
p. 9). The Decision and Order also found that Claimant explored all viable options before deciding 
to quit.. .. " (Decision and Order, p. 9). The Industrial Commission's conclusion that Fearn had good 
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cause to quit based upon Mr. Steed's inquiries into her personal life, religious practices, and 
allegedly sexist comments, which allegedly created a hostile work environment is not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
1. Fearn's Admitted Reasons for Quitting were Unrelated to Mr. Steed's Alleged 
Comments and Inquiries 
In her resignation letter, Fearn indicates that the occurrences at work which drove her toward 
resignation were related to her employer's failure to recognize her "skills and experience as a 
salesperson" and occurred in the last six months of her employment. The body of her letter, in its 
entirety, reads as follows: 
To whom it may concern, 
I have been employed at David Steed Company for the past 7 years. During that time 
we have had our differences. For the past six months I feel that my skills and 
experiences as a sales person are continually overlooked and undermined. I have 
done the things that have been asked of me on a daily basis and I feel I have gone 
over and above those duties and yet I am continually treated as in don't know how 
to do my job. 
I feel I have no alternative but to hand in my resignation. Please consider this my 5 
day notice in writing; my last day will be Wednesday April 8th, 2009. 
Sincerely, 
Tracy Fearn 
(Exhibit 3). There is no mention in the resignation letter of Steed's inquiries into Fearn's personal 
life or the alleged paternalistic and sexist tones of many comments and inquiries Claimant attributed 
to Steed. (Exhibit 3). Additionally, a review of the course of events of the six I months prior to 
Fearn's resignation documented in Exhibit 11 shows that Fearn's issues with her employer centered 
1 A measure of six months prior to her end of employment is used because of Fearn's own 
admission in her resignation letter that the problem causing her resignation began six months prior 
to her resignation letter. (See Exhibit 11). 
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around her sales performance and her treatment as a salesperson. Aside from a conversation on 
March 30, 2009, there is no mention of any comments from Mr. Steed or Alexander Steed related 
to Fearn's personal life, religious practices, or comments of a sexist or paternalistic nature for six 
months prior to her decision to quit. 
The resignation letter and the contents of Fearn' s journal during the six or more months prior 
to her resignation clearly indicate that the impetus for her resignation was Mr. Steed and Alexander 
Steed's treatment of her as related to her sales performance and not to any comments or inquiries 
made into her personal or religious life, or any allegedly sexist or paternalistic comments. As 
mentioned above, the Industrial Commission ultimately determined that Fearn did not show good 
cause for voluntarily terminating her employment with regard to her treatment related to her sales 
performance. Because Fearn's reason for resignation stemmed from treatment by her employer as 
related to her sales performance, and because she did not show good cause on that issue, and because 
Fearn's reason for resignation did not stem from Mr. Steed's comments regarding her personal life, 
religious life, or allegedly sexist or paternalistic comments, the Industrial Commission should reverse 
its finding that Fearn showed good cause for her voluntary resignation. 
2. Mr. Steed's Alleged Sexist, Religious and Paternalistic Comments to do not Rise 
to the Level of a Hostile Working Environment 
Additionally, the Industrial Commission's finding that Fearn showed good cause as related 
to "Mr. Steed's sexist comments to Claimant and his repeated inquiries into her religious practices 
and personal life, without her consent" should be overturned because Mr. Steed's comments on 
Fearn's personal life during the relevant time period were clearly mere annoyances to Fearn, and 
certainly did not rise to the level of a hostile working environment, i.e., good cause. Assuming Mr. 
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Steed's inquiries occurred, however well meant, the Decision and Order fails in any way to justify 
how these comments, most of which occurred months or years before her resignation, were 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Fearn's employment. Although denied by 
Mr. Steed, even assuming Fearn's "journal" entries accurately documented Fearn's encounters with 
Mr. Steed, Mr. Steed's actions failed to be sufficient or pervasive to drive someone from their 
employment. In fact, Fearn failed to even mention the alleged "hostile work environment" in her 
resignation letter. In addition, her "journal" entries for the last year of her employment, primarily 
dispute the pressure that was being placed on her to improve her performance. Her decision to quit 
has nothing to do with alleged sexist or religious comments. (Exhibit 11). 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court, a hostile working environment claim requires the 
following prima facie case: "(1) that the plaintiff was subjected to sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2) that this conduct was 
unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." De Los Santos v. JR. Simplot 
Co., Inc., 126 Idaho 963, 967, 895 P.2d 564, 568 (1995). This standard is closely repeated by the 
relevant Idaho Administrative Code for sexual harassment supporting good cause to quit: 
625. SEXUAL HARASSMENT. 
For purposes of Section 72-1366(5), Idaho Code, when a party asserts that sexual 
harassment was a reason for a claimant's separation from employment, "sexual 
harassment" is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: (3-19-99) 
01. Condition of Employment. Submission to such conduct was made either 




02. Employment Decisions. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by 
an individual was used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
individual. (3-19-99) 
03. Interference with PerformancelW ork Environment. Such conduct had 
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment. (3-19-99) 
Whether the harassment be based on sex or religion, the Idaho Supreme Court and the regulations 
make clear that the alleged harassment must be severe and pervasive enough to interfere with 
performance/work environment. Fearn admits she was annoyed by the alleged conduct, but there 
is no evidence it rose to the level of being severe or pervasive enough to establish a hostile work 
environment, i.e., good cause for leaving. 
The evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Steed made comments related to Fearn's 
personal and religious life only once during the six months prior to Fearn's resignation. Fearn 
documented these comments in her '1ournal." (See Exhibit 11, p. 43). However, Fearn's own 
commentary and documentation of this incident indicates that she did not take it seriously and was 
not really listening, as is shown by the tone and wording of the journal entry: 
David asked me about getting married and said "you know its tough to bring two 
families together especially when you have kids I don't think you guys can do it" 
"you have to be careful and work at it, I am not sure it will be worth it to you or not 
sure this is what you should be doing" He didn't like it because I wasn't really 
receptive to hear what he had to say and yet I just let him babble on and on about 
me and my personal life and my finances, and about being at church and making the 
boys go to church and how hard it will be to be married and I am stubborn enough 
that it just might not work" and then he gave me a little bit of an attitude talk because 
I wasn't listening or liking what he was telling me. I just shrugged my shoulders. 
(Exhibit 11, p. 43) (emphasis added). Good cause "must not be extended to include purely personal 
and (subjective) reasons which are unique to the employee - it must require that such cause is not 
12 
3f 
a condition which by common knowledge is usual where accompanied by minor irritations." Meyer 
v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 754, 758, 589 P.2d 89, 93 (1979) (citing Boodry v. Eddy 
Bakeries, Inc., 88 Idaho 165, 397 P.2d 256 (1964)). Based on Fearn's documentation of the 
incident with Mr. Steed, including her noted reaction to his comments, she saw Mr. Steed's 
comments as "minor irritations." Fearn's failure to mention any ofthe alleged "harassment" 
in her resignation letter is further indication that she did not perceive his comments or 
inquiries as severe and pervasive enough to alter her working environment.2 Fearn's 
allegations as supported by her own documentation are simply not enough to rise to the level 
of good cause or a hostile work environment. 
3. Fearn's Conclusory Statements that She Attempted to Address this 
Situation with Mr. Steed is not Supported by Substantial and Competent 
Evidence 
Notably absent from Fearn's resignation letter and journal during the relevant time 
periods is any mention of Fearn's attempts to address her concerns about Mr. Steed's 
comments with her employer. After the March 30, 2009, comments by Mr. Steed about 
Fearn's impending marriage, rather than seeking a resolution or "viable employment option," 
2 It is unclear whether Fearn's initial statement to the Idaho Department of Labor and 
Commerce is part of the record. It is not included as an exhibit, but it would be similar to a pleading, 
i.e., complaint, which is generally available for consideration on appeal. To the extent Claimant's 
Statement is part of the record and available for consideration by the Industrial Commission, it is 
attached as Exhibit A. In her initial statement, Fearn reported nothing about harassment or 
discrimination. In fact, she admitted she would not have quit if two incidences related to sales had 
not happened, neither of which would amount to discrimination or harassment. In addition, she 
stated: "I didn't feel like I had a choice. These issues have been going on for the past 6 months. I 
feel like I was treated like I didn't know how to do my job." 
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she merely shrugged her shoulders. (See Exhibit 11, p. 43).3 These actions do not 
demonstrate any effort on Fearn's part to explore "all viable employment options" before 
making the decision to quit. Moore v. Melaleuca, 137 Idaho 23, 28, 43 P.3d 782, 787 
(2002).4 
In fact, had Fearn indicated she was considering leaving because of Mr. Steed's 
comments and inquiries, the issue could have possibly been resolved. Instead, Fearn 
specifically stated in her resignation letter that she was leaving because, for the past six 
months, her "skills and experience as a sales person are continually overlooked and 
undermined." (Exhibit 3). Mr. Steed responded, "[ w ]hile I disagree with your employment 
characterization of the last six months, I accept your resignation." (Exhibit 4). Mr. Steed 
had no notice that comments or inquiries he had made primarily months or years earlier were 
Fearn's reason for leaving. 
Fearn's burden was to demonstrate that she had good cause to resign. She failed to 
produce substantial and competent evidence that Mr. Steed created a hostile working 
environment that was severe or pervasive enough to quit or that she exhausted all viable 
3 In its Decision and Order, the Industrial Commission concludes that Fearn "exhausted all 
viable options by telling Mr. Steed repeatedly that her personal life was none of his business." 
(Decision and Order, p. 9). However, Mr. Steed's comments prompting this reaction from Fearn, 
and Fearn's comments to Mr. Steed on this issue were all made prior to the time period in which 
Fearn asserts her employer engaged in actions which caused her to quit. 
4 It is important to keep in mind that Fearn's decision to quit did not arise from Mr. Steed's 
comments in any event, and thus, the issue of Fearn's failure to explore all viable employment 
options should ultimately have not been reached in the first place. 
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options. Fearn's own resignation letter andjournal demonstrate that her reason for quitting 
was because of performance issues. Only when Fearn was initially denied unemployment 
compensation benefits did she allege a hostile work environment. Even so, the allegations 
as asserted by Fearn which primarily occurred years and months before her resignation, do 
not support severe and pervasive harassment that would support good cause to quit. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon evidence in the record, Fearn's eligibility for unemployment benefits 
should have been decided on the basis of her discharge from employment with Steed, and not 
on her resignation which was pending at the time of her discharge for misconduct. 
Additionally, Fearn did not meet her burden to show good cause for voluntarily leaving her 
employment with Steed with substantial and competent evidence. Her resignation letter and 
journal clearly indicate that she terminated her employment not because of Mr. Steed's 
prying into her personal affairs and allegedly sexist and paternalistic comments, but based 
upon her treatment regarding her abilities as a salesperson. The Industrial Commission 
clearly indicated that Fearn failed to show good cause as related to her treatment regarding 
her abilities as a salesperson. Therefore, Steed respectfully requests that the Industrial 
Commission reconsider its conclusions in its Decision and Order and affirm the decision of 
the Appeals Examiner in this matter to deny Fearn unemployment compensation. 
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These are the claimL ""LIVH""''' to Job Service's questions reh 
What day did you quit or inform your employer that you were quitting? 
4/1/2009 
the separation. 
Why did you quit on this day? What was the final incidentllast straw that caused you to quit? 
although there were many many reasons, the last straw was being threatened that if I did not increase my sales I 
would be fired and then they proceeded to take my sales from me and give them to the other sales person. 
What specifically happened on the last day of work to cause you to quit? 
n/a 
If nothing happened on that day, what was the final incident (last straw) that caused you to quit?* 
On 3/31109 I made the decision to quit. I had been working with a customer from a different state on a sale. The 
customer called that day asking why we hadn't invoiced the sale yet. I went to Alexander, GM, also the owner's 
son, and asked him why it hadn't been invoiced. He said that they were going to wait a few days to process the 
invoice. That is all he said. Based on the delay, ifhe processed the invoice under his name, then he would have 
recei ved the commission, not me. I assumed the sale would have been processed under his name. The next thing 
that happened that day was a sales meeting I had with Alexander. He told me I had to provide specific info on the 
sales deals I was working on. Specific info had never been requested before. There were 3 big deals that I had 
been working on. He told me that David would now handle those deals. I asked him why. He just said that his 
dad told him to tell me that he would handle those from that point forward. I felt like those sales had also been 
taken away from me. That night I made the decision to quit. Had those two incidents not happened, I would not 
have quit that day. On 4/1109 I submitted my written resignation. I put a copy in separate envelopes for David and 
Alexander. David was not there when I did this. Alexander took both envelopes. I sit directly across from him 
and saw him open the envelope. He didn't say anything to me. He took his cell phone and went outside. I finished 
my shift and went home. On 4/2/09 I went to work. Around 10:00 a.m. Alexander told me to answer line 1. It was 
David. He said that he talked to Alexander and received my resignation. He asked if I would do them a favor and 
work one hour each day and cover for Alexander's lunches and he would pay me for the entire week. I told him 
that was fine. He said to arrange the time with Alexander. Within 5 minutes I went to talk to Alexander. I asked 
when he wanted me to come in and cover his lunch. He said to plan on 12-1 each day. I told him ifhe was sick or 
needed me to come in any other time, I would. He said OK. I went home and returned around 11 :50 a.m. and 
covered his lunch. On 4/3/08 I came in to relieve him for lunch around 11 :50 a.m. He told me to come in from 
now on exactly at noon. It was busy and I didn't leave until around 1 :40 p.m. that day. On 4/6/09 I came in. 
Alexander told me I needed to talk to David. David handed me my check and a written response to my 
resignation letter. He said he were done with my employment here. I asked if this was because of the email I sent 
on Friday. He said yes; that was wrong of me. I asked why because Alexander sends his cell phone number out 
all the time to customers. He said Alexander was part owner and it didn't pertain to him and he was done with me. 
Re: the email. On 4/2/09 I emailed my customers letting them know I was no longer going to be there after 
4/8/09. Within about an hour, I had many phone calls and emails from my customers. I was only working an hour 
so I couldn't respond to all of them. Around that same time Alexander was getting of copy of all my ingoing and 
outgoing emails. On 4/3/09 I sent out another email giving my customers my cell phone so they could call me 
after 4/8/09 if needed. I did that because I was only working one hour a day and didn't have the time to respond to 
them. I had been working with most of them for about 5 years. Apparently David did not like me sending out that 
email. 
What was the negative effect of the situation on you? 
I didn't feel like I had a choice. These issues have been going on for the past 6 months. I felt like I was treated 
like I didn't know how to do my job. It was stressful because I was told I had to increase my sales or I would be 
discharged yet sales were taken away from me. I have it all documented. (Claimant provided employment 
documentation) I did not see a doctor for my stress. 
Why did you feel you had no choice but to quit on that day?* 
I just felt like I couldn't take it any more. 
What did you expect from the employer? 
I expected them to let me do my job and get credited for my sales. 
What were your job duties? 
Sales Exhibit "A" 
Length of time performed and work schedule? 
7 years, Monday - Friday 8:30 - 5:30 pm 
Why could you no longer perform those duties?* Lt ~ 
~ 
review each email, each phone caII /. -
What did' you do to try and stay 
caIIer ID) every note. 
and when did you do it? (i.e.~ of-absence,transfer, file 
grievance, etc.) 
I talked to David. The last time I talked to him was around 3/26/09. I told him I was frustrated they were taking 
over my deals and not giving me credit, Alexander was micromanaging me. He would tell me to do something 
but change the process the next day and monitor every little thing I did. David said that I reported to Alexander 
and I would do what he said. 
If no attempts were made, why not?* 
nJa 
Other pertinent facts: 
I am providing a copy ofthe documentation I kept. At first I didn't record the dates, but then I started to. My last 
check says I was only paid through 4/6/09 not 4/8/09 as my resignation stated. 
By filing this claim electronically the claimant authorizes the above employer to release any records they have that they 
believe pertain to this claim for benefits. 
Idaho Department of Labor use only 
IFact Finder Name: DOE\tlivsey 
IEmployer's Phone: (208) 522-1463 IClaimant's phone: (208) 206-0734 
Under Idaho Code 72-137 J (2), it is a misdemeanor for an employer to knowingly make afalse statement or willfully fails to disclose a 
materialfact to prevent or reduce the payment of benefits to an individual entitled to them. 
1-77-501-Q (ver 1007) 
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IDOL # 4861-2009 
DECISION AND ORDER ON 
RECONSIDERATION 
Employer filed a request for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). 
Employer requests reconsideration of the Idaho Industrial Commission's Decision and Order 
filed on August 31, 2009. The Commission reversed the Decision issued by an Appeals 
Examiner with the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL). The Commission conducted a de novo 
review of the record and found that Claimant had good cause related to her employment for 
quitting her job and that Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. 
Claimant worked as a salesperson for Employer's farm equipment re-sale operations 
from January 2002 until April 2009. Claimant submitted a letter of resignation on April!, 2009, 
stating that her last day would be April 8, 2009. Claimant alleges that she quit because she was 
threatened, discriminated against, and harassed. On April 5th, Claimant sent an e-mail to 
approximately 7,500 clients informing them that after April 8th, she could be reached on her 
cellular phone. Employer discharged Claimant on April 6th for sending out the mass e-mail. 
In the request for reconsideration, Employer argues that Claimant's separation should be 
characterized as a discharge, not a quit. Employer properly discharged Claimant because she 
was using the company sales clientele list for a future personal sales platform. Employer 
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contends that even if the separation is viewed as a quit, Claimant did not prove good cause 
connected with her employment. 
DISCUSSION 
The Appeals Examiner's Decision and the Commission's Decision and Order begin with 
the premise that the only separation issue is Claimant's quit. At the hearing, both parties agreed 
that Claimant quit. On reconsideration, Employer argues that although Claimant quit, her later, 
unrelated discharge should be the basis of the determination pursuant to IDAPA 09.01.30.450.08 . 
. 08 Unrelated Discharge Prior to Pending Resignation. A claimant, 
discharged before a pending resignation has occurred, for reasons not related to 
the pending resignation, shall have his eligibility determined on the basis of the 
discharge, not on the pending resignation. 
IDAPA 09.01.30.450.08. 
A review of the facts, in particular the dates of Claimant's resignation and Employer's 
discharge of Claimant, shows that the IDAPA is applicable to this case. Employer discharged 
Claimant on April 6th, during her pending resignation which was to conclude on April 8th. 
Employer states that it discharged Claimant for the mass e-mail she sent, not because she resigned. 
Claimant's last day of work was April 6, 2009. As such, we find that Employer discharged 
Claimant for reasons not related to her pending resignation. Although the case was previously 
viewed as a quit, the facts in the record require the application ofIDAP A 09.01.30.450.08. 
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits if that individual's unemployment resulted from the claimant's discharge for 
employment-related misconduct. What constitutes 'just cause" in the mind of an employer for 
dismissing an employee is not the legal equivalent of "misconduct" under the Idaho Employment 
Security Law. The two issues are separate and distinct. Therefore, whether the employer had 
reasonable grounds according to its standards for dismissing a claimant is irrelevant. Our only 
concern is whether the reasons for discharge constituted "misconduct" connected with the 
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claimant's employment such that the claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. 
City ofIdaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986). 
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on 
the employer. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dept. of Labor v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 
320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). If the discharging employer does not meet that burden, 
benefits must be awarded to the claimant. Roll v. City of Middleton, 105 Idaho 22,25,665 P.2d 
721, 724 (1983); Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 419, 614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has established three grounds upon which to determine 
whether Claimant has engaged in "misconduct" as it applies to eligibility for unemployment 
benefits. The Idaho Supreme Court defines misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of the 
employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of 
behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Campbell v. Bonneville 
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 126 Idaho 222, 225, 880 P.2d 252, 255 (1994). Further, the Court 
requires the Commission to consider all three grounds in determining whether misconduct exists. 
Dietz v. Minidoka County Highway Dist., 127 Idaho 246, 248,899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995). 
Under the "standards of behavior" analysis, the employer must show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it communicated its expectations to the claimant, or that its expectations 
"flowed normally" from the employment relationship. Further, the employer must demonstrate 
that those expectations were objectively reasonable as applied to the claimant. As the Idaho 
Supreme Court has pointed out, an "employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only 
where they have been communicated to the employee." Folks v. Moscow School District No. 
281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P.2d 642,647 (1997). 
Notably, there is no requirement that the employer must demonstrate that the employee's 
behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her disregard of the 
employer's expectations. Welch v. Cowles Publishing Co., 127 Idaho 361, 364, 900 P.2d 1372, 
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1375 (1995). Because the employer need not demonstrate some form of "malice" on the part of 
the employee, what communication did or did not take place between the employer and the 
claimant becomes a key element in these cases. An employee can only be held accountable for 
breaching those expectations that he or she understood, explicitly or implicitly, and was capable 
of satisfying. Puckett v. Idaho Department of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d 407 (1985). 
Claimant worked for Employer as a salesperson. Claimant alleges that Employer's 
owner threatened, harassed, and discriminated against her. Because of these issues, Claimant 
submitted her resignation on April 1,2009. Claimant's last day was to be April 8, 2009. On or 
about April 5th, Claimant sent an e-mail to approximately 7,500 clients stating that after April 8, 
2009, she could be reached at her cellular phone number. Employer discharged Claimant on 
April 6, 2009, because of the mass e-mail. 
At hearing, Mr. Steed, the owner, testified that the e-mail was unethical and threatening. 
Claimant testified that she was not going into a competing business; she wanted to inform her 
customers that she would no longer be working at Employer's business and wanted a way for her 
customers to reach her. In the reconsideration, Employer argues that Claimant breached the 
Employer's expectation that all Claimant's e-mails be reviewed before they are sent. Although 
Claimant made a notation in her journal regarding this new expectation, neither party made 
mention of it at hearing. Mr. Steed testified that it was unethical and threatening and, in a letter, 
he stated that when he discovered she was using the client list, he could no longer trust Claimant. 
(Exhibit 5, p. 6). At no point does Employer claim that it communicated to Claimant the 
expectation that someone review every e-mail before it was sent. Nor did Employer make this 
argument when it discharged Claimant. The Commission finds that no expectation was 
communicated and in practice regarding having a supervisor review every e-mail Claimant 
drafted before she sent it. Further, the Commission finds that the expectation to have a 
supervisor review all e-mails does not flow normally from the employment relationship. 
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While it is understandable that Employer was not happy about Claimant e-mailing a large 
number of customers about her departure from Employer's business, we cannot find that it 
violated any communicated expectations or expectation which naturally flowed from the 
employment relationship. 
N ext, we address whether Claimant's conduct constitutes an intentional disregard of the 
employer's interest or a deliberate violation of the employer's rules. Sending an e-mail to a large 
number of Employer's customers informing them that Claimant could be reached at her cellular 
number after April 8, 2009, surely tipped many customers off that Claimant was ending her 
employment relationship with Employer. But it does not necessarily follow that it was an 
intentional disregard of the employer's interest or a deliberate violation of the Employer's rules. 
Claimant did not state or imply that she would be working for someone else, which might be 
against Employer's interest. Any speculation as to what the customers implied from the e-mail is 
pure speculation on Employer's part. Employer did not argue that Claimant's e-mail violated 
any rule that was in place. 
Although Claimant's discharge was a decision within Employer's discretion, it bears 
repeating that the burden of demonstrating that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-
related misconduct rests strictly on Employer. The evidence in this record is insufficient to 
establish that Claimant's behavior in sending out the e-mail in question amounted to misconduct. 
Therefore, Employer has failed to meet its burden of proof. Because Employer has not met its 
burden in demonstrating that it discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct, 
Claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits. 
Because we conclude that Employer discharged Claimant for reasons other than 
employment-related misconduct, we find that Employer's account is chargeable for experience 
rating purposes. 
DECISION AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION - 5 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I 
Employer discharged Claimant for reasons other than employment-related misconduct 
II 
Employer's account is chargeable for experience rating purposes. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, Employer's Motion for Reconsideration IS 
GRANTED. The Decision and Order is AFFIRMED as modified regarding the type of 
separation, but resulting in the same eligibility conclusion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis.z;t.dayof ~ 201lJ-. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman 
" 
ATTEST: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that oniJ..i day of ~ 20.aJ, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION was served by regular 
United States mail upon each of the following: 
TRACY E FEARN 
PO BOX 3569 
IDAHO FALLS ID 8340.4 
DAVID C AND MARSHA STEED 
DBA DAVID STEED COMPANY 
380.5 N YELLOWSTONE HWY 
IDAHO FALLS ID 8340.1 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 WMAIN ST 
BOISE ID 83735 
sc 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
En1ail: chomer(tv.holdeniegal.com 
DeA.i:me Caspe~(jn, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
Email: dcasDerson@b.oldenle~al.com 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, p .L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls,In 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
q. 
Attorneys for Emp] oyer/Appellant 
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ClaimantIRespondellt, 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, TRACY E. FEARN, THE IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, AND THE 
CLERK OF 'THE ABOVE ENTITLED ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. 
1. "{ The above named Appellants, David C. Steed and Marsha Steed appeal a.gainst the 
above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision and 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
Email: chomer@holdenlegal.com 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
Email: dcasperson@holdenlegal.com 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Employer/Appellant 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY E. FEARN, IDOL NO. 4861-2009 
ClaimantiRespondent, 
v. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DA VID C. AND MARSHA STEED, 
Employer/Appellant, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, TRACY E. FEARN, THE IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. 
1. The above named Appellants, David C. Steed and Marsha Steed appeal against the 
above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision and 
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Order on Reconsideration entered in the above entitled proceeding on the 24th day 
of December, 2009. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 
lied) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and Rule 12 of the Rules of Appellate Practice 
and Procedure under the Idaho Employment Security Law. 
3. Appellants assert the following issues on appeal: 
(a) whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding Tracy E. Fearn was 
discharged for reasons other than employment-related misconduct; and 
(b) whether the Industrial Commission erred by failing to determine whether 
Tracy E. Fearn had good cause to quit. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) A transcript of the unemployment compensation hearing is requested. 
(b) The Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the 
Unemployment Compensation hearing in [ ] hard copy [X] electronic 
format [ ] both: 
(1) Unemployment Compensation Hearing of May 28,2009, before the 
Appeals Bureau of the Idaho Department of Labor, Appeals Examiner 
Brent Marchbanks presiding. 
6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the agency's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.: 
2 - Notice of Appeal 
All Exhibits submitted to the Industrial Commission as part of the record, which 
include the Exhibits listed below in paragraph 7. 
70 The Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
Ex. 1 - Notice of Telephone Hearing (3 pages) 
Ex. 2 - "Important Information About Your Hearing" (2 pages) 
Ex. 3 - Correspondence from Tracy Fearn to David Steed, Alexander Steed, and 
David Steed Company dated April!, 2009, tendering Ms. Fearn's 
resignation ( 1 page) 
Ex. 4 - Correspondence from David Steed to Tracy Fearn dated April 6, 2009 
accepting Ms. Fearn's resignation (1 page) 
Ex. 5 - Documents submitted to Idaho Department of Labor by David Steed 
Company regarding Ms. Fearn's performance (9 pages) 
Ex. 6 - Background check information regarding Ms. Fearn and signs displayed by 
Ms. Fearn in the workplace (4 pages) 
Ex. 7 - Correspondence submitted to Idaho Department of Labor by David Steed 
Company dated April 29, 2009, responding to Ms. Fearn's allegations (2 
pages 
Ex. 8 - Notes and documents submitted to the Idaho Department of Labor on April 
30,2009 by Tracy Fearn (13 pages) 
3 - Notice of Appeal 
$; 
Ex. 9 - Eligibility Determination - Unemployment Insurance Claim (2 pages) 
Ex. 10 - Request for Appeals Hearing by Tracy Fearn (1 page) 
Ex. 11 - Email, notes andjoumal submitted by Tracy Fearn (45 pages) 
Ex. 12 - Employer data (1 page) 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each agency of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Name and address: Idaho Industrial Commission, PO Box 83720, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-0041 
(b) (1) ~ That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been 
paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript 
(2) 0 That the Appellants are exempt from paying the estimated transcript 
feebecause _________________________________________ ~ 
(c) (1) ~ That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's 
record has been paid. 
(2) 0 That the Appellants are exempt from paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the record because ______________________ ---" 
( d) (1) ~ That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) 0 That Appellants are exempt from paying the appellate filing fee 
because -------------------------------------------
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(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-
1401(1), Idaho Code. 
DATED this ZlJday of January, 2010. 
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DeAnne Casperson 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.CO 
Attorney for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, 
with the correct postage thereon, on this 1J~ day of January, 2010. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Tracy E. Fearn 
PO Box 3569 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
G:\WPDATA\CAH\9098\07 - Tracy Feam\Notice of AppeaJ.wpd 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
( v{First Class Mail 
( }'!,and Delivery 
( Ii) Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( V; First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( First Class Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Overnight Mail 
DeAnne Casperson 
fDA: - _ iP r 
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December 24, 2009 
Tracy E. Fearn, Pro Se 
PO Box 3569 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
DeAnne Casperson 
Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo 
1000 Riverwalk Drive Ste 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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Dated: 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 
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Tracy E. Fearn, Pro SelRespondent 
and 
Idaho Department of LaborlRespondent 
JanUffiy 26, 2010 
$86.00 
CERTIFICATION 
I, Mary Schoeler, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal filed January 26, 2010; Decision and Order, filed August 31, 
2009; and Order Denying Reconsideration, filed December 24, 2009; and the whole thereof. 
DATED: January 29,2010 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Carol Haight, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record on appeal by 
Rule 28(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits admitted in this proceeding are correctly listed in the List 
of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court after the Record is settled. 
DATED thisDy of ~ ,2010. 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (Tracy Fearn - S.C. 37368) - 1 
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TRACY E. FEARN, 
Claimant/Respondent, 
vs. 
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SUPREME COURT #37368 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and 
Tracy E. Fearn, Pro Se, ClaimantlRespondent; and 
DeAnne Casperson, Employer/Appellant, and 
Tracey K. Rolfsen, Idaho Department of Labor, Respondent. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served 
by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
For ClaimantiRespondent: 
Tracy E. Fearn, Pro Se 
PO Box 3569 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
For Employer! Appellant: 
DeAnne Casperson 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn, and Crapo 
PO Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130 
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For Respondent: 
Tracey K. Rolfsen 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83735 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the 
Agency's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. 
In the event no objections to the Agency's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the 
twenty-eight day period, the Agency's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
DATEDthis3~Of ~ ,2010. 
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